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I. INTRODUCTION
A contract, especially a collective bargaining agreement, is often/ the result of a series of bargaining sessions, and the parties
k usually have had a pattern of numerous agreements and
understandings between them. As a result, the parties often agree to insert
a contract clause in the final written agreement stating that the written
agreement is the "final expression of all the terms agreed upon and is a
complete and exclusive statement of those terms."'
In labor and employment contracts, these contract clauses are referred
to by numerous different labels.2 There is great confusion over the proper
'JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3-6, at
156 (3d ed. 1987).
2 Some of the labels used for a merger clause include: an "integration clause,"
a "zipper clause," a "buttoning-up clause," a "contract finality clause," a
"completeness-of-agreement clause," a "full agreement clause," an "entire
agreement clause," and a "wrap-up clause." See Hubbell Indus. Controls v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 1825, 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 350,353
(1992) (Talarico, Arb.) (referring to a merger clause as a zipper clause and stating
that the clause can also be referred to as an integration clause or completeness-of-
agreement clause); Augsburg College v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local 70,91 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1166, 1173 (1988) (Gallagher, Arb.) (referring
to a merger clause as an entire agreement clause); Arvin Indus., Inc. v. UAW,
Local 1930,77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 14, 18 (1981) (Yarowsky, Arb.) (referring
to a merger clause as a zipper clause and stating that it can also be referred to as a
wrap-up clause); Bassick Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 229,
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label for this type of contract clause. It is not uncommon for judges,
arbitrators, academics, and practitioners to refer to this clause as a "zipper
clause." The authors conclude that this provision is better described as a
"merger" or "integration clause" and that the term "zipper clause" cannot
properly be used as a synonym. A more precise use of the term "zipper
clause" applies only to the waiver of the statutory duty to bargain during
the term of a contract.3
A merger clause, often associated with the parol evidence rule, is a
contract clause that "expressly provides that the writing constitutes the
entire agreement between the parties, and that any prior or contemporane-
ous agreements, representations, or warranties are excluded."4 Thus, a
merger clause signifies "'the extinguishment of one contract by its
absorption into another contract."' 5 A merger clause, unlike the zipper
clause, is used in contracts generally and is not exclusive to the labor law
setting.
A basic thesis of these comments is to identify and distinguish the
zipper clause and the merger clause as used in labor agreements. Particular
emphasis will be given to the impact of merger clauses on past practices.
A past practice is "a prior course of conduct which is consistently made in
response to a recurring situation and which the parties regard as the correct
and required response under the circumstances." 6 Employers and unions
often reach agreements and understandings and develop interpretations in
applying the collective bargaining agreement which are not expressly stated
26 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 627, 629-30 (1956) (Kheel, Arb.) (discussing a merger
clause that was labeled a "Full Agreement Clause" in the collective bargaining
agreement); MATTHEW A. KELLY, LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: TERMS,
LAWS, COURT DECISIONS, AND ARBITRATION STANDARDS 90 (1987) (stating that
a zipper clause expresses that"the contract language contains the entire agreement"
and that the terms "buttoning-up clause" and "contract finality clause" can also be
used to describe this type of clause).
3 See WALTER E. BAER, PRACTICE AND PRECEDENT IN LABOR RELATIONS 15
(1972).
4Kerry L. Macintosh, When Are Merger Clauses Unconscionable?, 64 DENV.
U. L. REV. 529, 530 (1988).
' Mark K. Glasser & Keith A. Rowley, On Parol: The Construction and
Interpretation of Written Agreements and the Role of Extrinsic Evidence in
Contract Litigation, 49 BAYLORL. REV. 657,711 (1997) (quoting Smith v. Smith,
794 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tex. App. 1990)).
6 JAY E. GRENIG & R. WAYNE ESTES, LABOR ARBITRATION ADVOCACY:
EFFECTIVE TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES § 6.45 (1989).
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in the collective bargaining agreement itself. This is referred to as a past
practice.
A dispute often arises when one party attempts to unilaterally end a
past practice. The following example illustrates this situation:7 A company
distributed turkeys to all of their employees, including unionized employ-
ees, at Christmas for over twenty years. There is no provision in the
contract regarding the "turkey bonus." This year, however, the company
decided to discontinue the turkey bonus. The union filed a grievance, and
the company defended its action by pointing out the merger clause
contained in the collective bargaining agreement. What result? Is the
employer bound by the past practice or can the past practice be unilaterally
discontinued because the merger clause extinguished any agreements or
understandings not contained in the written agreement? What factors will
an arbitrator consider in determining the effectiveness of the merger
clause? This Article primarily focuses on these issues.
Before discussing a merger clause's effect on past practices, however,
foundational concepts must be explored and differentiated. Part II
distinguishes between a merger clause and a zipper clause.' Each concept
is explored, and the current legal standards applied to the two concepts are
examined. Additionally, the parol evidence rule, as associated with the
merger clause, is considered.9 Part III explores the concept and the
development of a past practice.'" In order to determine the effect of a
merger clause on past practices, over one hundred arbitration decisions,
published and unpublished, were examined. Part IV contains the results of
this examination, exploring the factors on which arbitrators focus in
determining the effectiveness of a merger clause's elimination of a binding
past practice."l These factors include the semantics of the merger clause, 2
whether the past practice continued unabated into the new contract period,13
the parties' bargaining history, 4 whether the past practice is related to a
subject contained in the contract," and the peculiar facts and circumstances
' This example is not drawn from any particular case; however, disputes over
"turkey bonuses" are common. See, e.g., Radioear Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 362 (1974)
(involving a "turkey money bonus").
8 See infra notes 18-79 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 47-74 and accompanying text.
10See infra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 95-268 and accompanying text.
'
2 See infra notes 102-84 and accompanying text.
'
3 See infra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 207-41 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
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of the case which affect the arbitrator's decision. 6 Part V summarizes the
authors' conclusions. 7
II. ZIPPER CLAUSE VS. MERGER CLAUSE
A. The Zipper Clause
A zipper clause is often confused with a merger or integration clause.
Sometimes the term "zipper clause" is used as a synonym for a merger or
integration clause. 8 In the labor law setting, a zipper clause "'zips up' the
agreement by stating that the parties have had the right and opportunity to
bargain over all mandatory subjects of bargaining and that they waive their
right to bargain over any matters during the term of the agreement."' 19 It
'
6See infra notes 250-68 and accompanying text
'
7See infra notes 269-85 and accompanying text.
'
8 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
19 BRUCE S. FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 129 (1980); see also
Reid Carron & Angela Broughton, When Is "'No" Really "No "?-The NLRB's
Current Position on the Freedom of Contract, Management Rights, and Waiver, 13
LAB. LAW. 299,299 (1997) (stating that by including such a clause in an agreement,
"the parties agree that no obligation exists to bargain over certain issues for the
duration of the agreement").
The following is an example of a typical zipper clause:
"The Parties acknowledge that during the negotiations which resulted
in this Agreement each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make
demands and proposals with respect to any subject or matter not removed
by law from the area of collective bargaining, and that the understandings
and agreements arrived at by the Parties after exercise of that right and
opportunity are set forth and solely embodied in this Agreement.
Therefore the Corporation and the Union, for the life of this Agreement,
each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the right, and each agree [sic]
that the other shall not be obligated, to bargain collectively with respect to
any subject matter referred to, or covered in this Agreement, or with respect
to any subject or matter not specifically referred to or covered in this
Agreement, even though such subjects or matters may not have been within
the knowledge or contemplation of either or both of the Parties at the time
they negotiated or signed this Agreement."
BAERsupra note 3, at 16 (quoting a labor agreement between Rubber Workers and
Samsonite Corporation, Murfreesboro, Tennessee). A more concisely stated zipper
clause was contained in the agreement underlying the dispute in Mount Vernon
EducationalAss 'n v. Illinois EducationalLaborRelations Board, 663 N.E.2d 1067
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996), which stated: "The parties each voluntarily and unqualifiedly
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
appears that a more precise use of the term "zipper clause" would only
apply to such waiver clauses, although a zipper clause may coexist with a
merger or integration clause.2"
The National Labor Relations Act requires the employer and the union
to bargain collectively about "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment." ' During the term of a collective bargaining agreement,
there is no duty to bargain on terms "contained in" the labor agreement.'
waive any rights which might otherwise exist under law to negotiate over any
matter during the term of this Agreement, and each agrees that the other shall not
be obligated to bargain collectively during the term of this Agreement." Id. at 1071.
Zipper clauses can be either narrow or broad. A narrow zipper clause attempts
to exclude only topics actually discussed during contract negotiations from the
statutory duty to bargain, while a broad zipper clause attempts to foreclose the duty
to bargain over any topic not in the final agreement, even if the topic was not
discussed during negotiations. See id. at 1070.
20 See, for example, the agreement at issue in Lone Star Brewing Co. v.
International Union of United Brewery Workers, Local 110, 53 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1317, 1317-18 (1969) (Autrey, Arb.).
" National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). For a
discussion of the three types of bargaining topics, mandatory, permissible, and
illegal, see 1 SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, AMERICAN BARASS'N,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 594-96 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992 & Supp.
1997) [hereinafter DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
' See National Labor Relations Act § 8(d). The National Labor Relations Act
states:
[T]he duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to
discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained
in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective
before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of
the contract.
Id. (emphasis added). The members of the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") in Jacobs Manufacturing Co. interpreted "contained in" differently. See
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952);
see also FLORIAN BARTOSIC & ROGER C. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR 325 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing Jacobs Mfg. Co.). Members
Reynolds and Murdock interpreted the provision to allow the parties to refuse to
bargain over any topic during the term of a collective bargaining agreement unless
doing so would be inconsistent with an express contract provision. See Jacobs Mfg.
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. at 1228-35. Members Houston and Styles interpreted "contained
in" to allow the parties to refuse to bargain over any topic that was actually
included in the written collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 1217-20.
Chairman Herzog articulated the final view that "contained in" not only includes
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If a mandatory topic is "contained in" the collective bargaining agreement,
neither party has a duty to bargain about the matter, and neither party may
unilaterally modify the term without the consent of the other party.2 3 If a
mandatory topic is not "contained in" the collective bargaining agreement,
either party may effect a change once the party has "bargain[ed] in good
faith to impasse."24 However, this duty to bargain may be waived.25 A
zipper clause is usually inserted in the collective bargaining agreement,
most often by management, as an attempt to foreclose its duty to bargain
during the term of the agreement.26
A waiver issue often arises after an employer has unilaterally imple-
mented a change to a mandatory bargaining topic during the term of the
contract without giving notice or without bargaining to an impasse with the
union.2 7 Such an act often results in the union filing an unfair labor
written terms, but also includes terms "consciously explored" during contract
negotiations even though they were not actually included in the final agreement.
See id. at 1227-28. Thus, if a topic was consciously explored but not ultimately
adopted in the contract, the term has been waived. See id. This final approach has
been adopted by most courts. See BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, supra, at 325.
3 See National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d); Kenneth L. Wagner, "No "Means
"No" When a Party "Really" Says So: The NLRB's Continued Adherence to the
Clear and Unmistakable Waiver Doctrine in Unilateral Change Cases, 13 LAB.
LAW. 325,326 n.1 (1997).
24 Wagner, supra note 23, at 326 n. 1; see also National Labor Relations Act §
8(d).
25 See FELDACKER, supra note 19, at 129.
26 See BAER, supra note 3, at 15; cf 48A AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor
Relations § 3187 (1994) (discussing reopener clauses which require a party to the
agreement to give notice before changing a contract term).
In addition to inserting a written zipper clause into the collective bargaining
agreement, the duty to bargain can be waived by bargaining room conduct and by
the failure to act. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 21, at 700; see also
FELDACKER, supra note 19, at 129. For a discussion of waiver by bargaining
history, see DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 21, at 705-08. For a discussion
of waiver by inaction, see id. at 708-10.
27 See Wagner, supra note 23, at 326; see also ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 469 (1976)
(stating that "[t]he vast preponderance of cases applying the 'clear and unequivocal
waiver' principle do indeed involve a charge that the employer unilaterally
announced or implemented a change in the status quo without giving notice or an
opportunity to bargain to the union").
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practice charge against the company.28 While such an act would normally
constitute a violation of the National Labor Relations Act,29 the employer
will argue that the union waived the employer's duty to bargain by agree-
ing to the insertion of a zipper clause in the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
3 0
However, the insertion of a zipper clause will not necessarily absolve
the party's duty to bargain unless the "clear and unmistakable" test is
successfully met.3 ' In order for a valid waiver to be found, there must be
clear and unmistakable contract language evidencing the parties' intent to
' See Carron & Broughton, supra note 19, at 300. Another issue involving the
zipper clause is whether the NLRB or an arbitrator should decide the waiver issue.
While traditionally the NLRB has heard waiver issues, "[mI]ore recently, however,
the Board has expressed a preference to have union charges of unilateral action
during the contract processed through the grievance and arbitration provisions of
the parties' contract." GORMAN, supra note 27, at 467. Thus, the NLRB's
jurisdiction under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act has been
ignored in preference for the greater speed and efficiency of the arbitration system.
See id. The NLRB's deference to the arbitration procedure has been referred to as
the Collyer doctrine. See DEVELOPING LABORLAW,supra note 21, at 705; see also
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971) (creating the Collyer doctrine).
For further discussion of the Collyer doctrine, see DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 21, at 704-05, 1041-45, and Carron & Broughton, supra note 19, at 301 n. 11.
29 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5). See generally DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra note 21, at 596-601 (discussing the per se violation of the
National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain over a mandatory topic and,
instead, unilaterally implementing a change in the status quo).30 See Wagner, supra note 23, at 326; see also GORMAN, supra note 27, at 469.
31 See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 21, at 700; see also, e.g., Trojan
YachtDiv. ofBertram-Trojan, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 741,741-43 (1995) (holding that
there was no clear and unmistakable waiver of the duty to bargain over changes
made in a pension plan where a contract provision stated that the plan was to be
"maintained in the same manner and to the same extent such plans are generally
made available and administered on a corporate basis"); Exxon Research & Eng'g
Co., 317 N.L.R.B. 675, 675 (1995) (holding that there was no clear and
unmistakable waiver of the duty to bargain over thrift plans because the contract
stated that the bargaining unit employees' eligibility for the thrift plan should not
be affected by the contract), enforcement denied on other grounds, 89 F.3d 228
(5th Cir. 1996); Flatbush Manor Care Ctr., 315 N.L.R.B. 15, 19-20 (1994) (holding
that there was no clear and unmistakable waiver of the duty to bargain over the
elimination of a bonus program because the language in a memorandum was
ambiguous and the union's action after the unilateral change indicated that it did
not intend the memorandum as a waiver of the duty to bargain).
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waive the duty to bargain.32 A waiver may also be found based on the
parties' bargaining history.33 "[T]he Boardrequires evidence that the matter
in issue was 'fully discussed and consciously explored during negotiations
and the union must have consciously yielded or clearly and unmistakably
waived its interest in the matter."' 34 Both the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") and the courts have "confined the waiver doctrine
narrowly and have been reluctant to infer a waiver."35 If a valid waiver is
found, only the specific item or items mentioned will be subject to waiver,
not the general category.
36
32 See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 21, at 700. In 1967, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the NLRB's application of the clear and unmistakable
standard in NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421,430 (1967) (upholding
the NLRB's refusal to find a waiver of the duty to bargain before implementing a
premium pay plan under the clear and unmistakable test). For a discussion of C &
CPlywood Corp., see Wagner, supra note 23, at 336-37. In 1983, the Court once
again affirmed the clear and unmistakable test. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 460 U.S. 693,707-10 (1983) (upholding theNLRB's holding that a general
no-strike provision did not waive the right to strike over an unfair labor practice
under the clear and unmistakable test). The Court stated: "We will not infer from
a general contractual provision that the parties intended to waive a statutorily
protected right unless the undertaking is 'explicitly stated.' More succinctly, the
waiver must be clear and unmistakable." Id. at 708 (citing Mastro Plastics, Inc. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283 (1956)). For a discussion of Metropolitan Edison Co.,
see Carron & Broughton, supra note 19, at 300-02.
33 See BAER, supra note 3, at 16; DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 21, at
701. Originally, the NLRB strictly required clear and unmistakable language in the
contract to constitute a waiver; however, in Radioear Corp., the NLRB looked
beyond the language of the broad zipper clause to the bargaining history of the
parties and held that the duty to bargain over a "turkey money bonus" was waived
because a maintenance-of-benefits clause had been consciously explored and
yielded by the union during negotiations. See Radioear Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 362,
364 (1974); DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 21, at 702-03. The NLRB
continues to analyze the waiver issue in accordance with Radioear; however, the
circuit courts are split on the issue and apply various approaches. See id. at 703 &
nn.761-62.
34 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 21, at 701 (quoting Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1346, 1347 (1982)). For a discussion of the recent case law
applying the fully discussed and consciously explored standard, see id. at 706-07.
35 I1. at 700.
36 See C & CPlywood Corp., 385 U.S. at 430-31 (holding that a contract clause
stating that management had the right to pay "any particular employee for some
special fitness, skill, aptitude or the like" at a rate above the normal contract rate
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
While the NLRB has consistently applied the clear and unmistakable
waiver test," another approach to determining whether the right to bargain
has been properly waived is the "contract coverage" test.38 Because of the
heavy burden imposed under the clear and unmistakable test, the decision
as to what test to apply to a given situation is often outcome determinative.
It has been argued that the "rote application of the 'clear and unmistakable'
waiver rubric" makes it virtually impossible for employers to successfully
meet the burden.39 Thus, the contract coverage test has been argued as a
did not constitute a waiver regarding the employer's change in wage rate for the
entire classification of employees). See generally GORMAN, supra note 27, at 469-
72 (discussing case law on the scope of a waiver).37 The NLRB has solely applied the clear and unmistakable test since 1993. See
Carron & Broughton, supra note 19, at 305. But cf Southern Cal. Edison Co., 310
N.L.R.B. 1229 (1993) (deferring to the arbitrator's application of the contract
coverage test).
38 See Carron & Broughton, supra note 19, at 303-04. The District of Columbia
Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have applied the contract coverage test to
management rights clauses. See NLRB v. United States Postal Serv., 8 F.3d 832,
838 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that abroad management rights clause, which stated
that the employer had the exclusive right "[t]o transfer and assign employees,"
"[tlo determine the methods, means, and personnel by which [its] operations are
to be conducted," and "[t]o maintain the efficiency of the operations entrusted to
it," allowed the employer to unilaterally implement cost-cutting measures,
including reducing service hours) (quoting collective bargaining agreement);
Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 974 F.2d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
"[t]he union had a statutory right to bargain over the terms of employment.., of
which a provision regulating behavior off thejob was one, but it gave up that right,
so far as the subjects comprehended by the management-rights clause were
concerned, by agreeing to the clause") (citation omitted). For a general discussion
of United States Postal Service and Chicago Tribune Co., see Wagner, supra note
23, at 329-31.
A management rights clause is a "clause which identifies, either generally or in
detail, the employer's exclusive right to manage and conduct the business, and the
right to direct the work force, including the right to hire, discipline, and discharge."
KELLY, supra note 2, at 51. For a general discussion of management rights clauses,
see DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 21, at 703-04.
" Carron & Broughton, supra note 19, at 301. According to Carron and
Broughton's research, there were no decisions by the NLRB between 1993 and
1996 in which the zipper clause was held to effectively eliminate the duty to
bargain. See id. at 299 & n.2. Caron and Broughton argue that the application of
the clear and unmistakable test is applied
with the desired result being to force employers to, at minimum, bargain
with the union (and, at maximum, obtain the union's consent) before
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superior approach for evaluating zipper clauses." The contract coverage
test focuses on whether the contract language agreed to by the parties
supports the unilateral action." It has been argued that this is the superior
approach to the waiver issue because it requires the parties to abide by the
terms of the agreement they freely reached during negotiations.42 While the
contract coverage test has been adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit
and the Seventh Circuit,43 the NLRB and the majority of courts continue to
apply the clear and unmistakable approach to determine the effectiveness
of a zipper clause."
B. The Merger Clause
The merger clause is a contract clause that states that the written
agreement is the final and total agreement between the parties.45 Unlike the
making any change in terms or conditions of employment during the term
of a collective bargaining agreement, even if the agreement contains
language, freely negotiated, that the employer reasonably believes reserves
the right to unilaterally take the action at issue.
Id. at 324.
4 0 See id.
4 1 See id. at 304.
42 See id. Carron and Broughton believe that the clear and unmistakable test
wrongly protects the union from the "consequences of give-and-take contract
negotiations." Id. at 299. Gorman argues that enforcing a waiver furthers contract
stability if the union has clearly waived its privilege to have the employer bargain
on a topic and has accepted some concession of value from the company in
exchange. See GORMAN, supra note 27, at 466-67. However, allowing the union
to keep the concession and not abide by its agreement would not further contract
stability. See id.
43 See supra note 38 (discussing the D.C. Circuit and Seventh Circuit cases that
have applied the contract coverage test).
"See supra notes 31-32, 37 (discussing the application of the clear and
unmistakable test by the NLRB and the courts).
45 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-6, at 156; see also Glasser &
Rowley, supra note 5, at 711 (stating that the merger clause signifies "the
extinguishment of one contract by its absorption into another contract");
Macintosh, supra note 4, at 530 (defining a merger clause as that which "expressly
provides that the writing constitutes the entire agreement between the parties, and
that any prior or contemporaneous agreements, representations, or warranties are
excluded").
It is important to distinguish the parol evidence rule from the rules regarding
the use of extrinsic evidence in the process of interpreting a contract. Generally, the
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zipper clause, the merger clause is used in contracts generally and is not
exclusive to the labor law setting. While the elementary law of contracts is
not rigidly applied to labor agreements, they are not totally free of it.'
However, in order to understand the merger clause and its full impact, it is
useful to examine the use and effect of the merger clause in connection
with the parol evidence rule.
1. The Parol Evidence Rule
A written contract, especially a collective bargaining agreement, is
often the result of a series of several negotiating sessions. Sometimes
during a subsequent lawsuit involving what is covered by a contract, a
party may attempt to introduce these prior negotiations as evidence "to
show that the terms of the agreement are other than as shown on the face
of the writing."'47 When this occurs, the parol evidence rule becomes
relevant.
If the judge decides that the parol evidence rule applies[,] he excludes the
offered term not because it was not agreed upon but because under the
rule it is legally immaterial. Conversely, if he decides that the parol
parol evidence rule addresses what the agreement encompasses, and the
interpretation rules address what the contract means. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY,
JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 84, at 396 (3d ed. 1990). Therefore, these are
different inquiries.
46 Compare Certified Corp. v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers, 597 F.2d
1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that "[t]he courts have not strictly adhered to
contract rules in dealing with collective bargaining agreements"), with Mohr v.
Metro E. Mfg. Co., 711 F.2d 69,72-73 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying the parol evidence
rule to a collective bargaining agreement and holding that a prior oral agreement
was admissible because the agreement was not completely integrated). For a
discussion of case law applying the parol evidence rule to collective bargaining
agreements, see Anthony Carabba, Comment, Merk v. Jewel Food Stores: The
Parol Evidence Rule Applied to Collective Bargaining Agreements-A Trend
Toward More Formality in the Name ofNational Labor Policy, 10 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 719,727-32 (1993).
47 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.2, at 209 (2d ed. 1998). While not
pertinent to labor law employment situations, the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") contains the parol evidence rule applicable to the sale of goods. See
U.C.C. § 2-202 (1989). See generally ROBERTA. HILLMAN E" AL., COMMON LAW
ANDEQUITYUNDERTHEUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3.05[1] (1985) (discussing
the application of the parol evidence rule under the UCC); 1 JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-10 (3d ed. 1988).
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evidence rule does not apply[,] he admits the term agreed upon into
evidence but then leaves to the jury the issue of fact as to whether such a
term was actually agreed upon.48
The parol evidence rule basically indicates that a final and total written
agreement between the parties (a total or complete integration) cannot be
supplemented or contradicted by prior or contemporaneous agreements.49
Additionally, a final written agreement that is intended only as a partial
expression of the parties' agreement (a partial integration) can be supple-
mented by prior or contemporaneous agreements, but cannot be contra-
dicted by such agreements." The parol evidence rule is inapplicable when
determining whether conditions precedent in the contract have occurred,5'
whether the agreement is supportedby consideration, 2 whether the contract
is illegal, 53 whether the contract is void or voidable,5 4 and whether the
48 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-2(c), at 140.
49 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 215 (1981); see also, e.g.,
Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Garrison, 454 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Ark. 1970) (excluding
evidence of a promise to refinance and a guarantee of competitive feed prices
because the agreement was completely integrated); Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 126
A. 791, 792 (Pa. 1924) (excluding an alleged promise that the lessee would have
the exclusive right to sell soft drinks at the drugstore and stating that "the written
lease is the complete contract of the parties, and since it embraces the field of the
alleged oral contract, evidence of the latter is inadmissible under the parol evidence
rule").
The parol evidence rule applies to both written and oral prior or
contemporaneous agreements. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 7.2, at 212;
see also, e.g., HooverUniversal, Inc. v. Brockway Imco, Inc., 809 F.2d 1039, 1043
(4th Cir. 1987) (excluding a written representation by the seller in a handout under
Virginia's parol evidence rule because the purchase agreement was totally
integrated).
5o See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 210(2), 215-216. For a
discussion of whether a term is consistent or contradictory, see CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-5, at 154-55.
5' See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-7(b), at 158-59.52 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 7.4, at 233; see also, e.g., Fountain Hill
Millwork Bldg. Supply Co. v. Belzel, 587 A.2d 757, 761 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(holding the parol evidence rule inapplicable to the determination ofwhether a note
was supported by consideration).
53 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(d); see also Glasser &
Rowley, supra note 5, at 730 (stating that parol evidence may be used to prove that
a contract is "contrary to law, public policy, or public morals").
4 See Glasser & Rowley, supra note 5, at 719 (stating that "[p]arol evidence is
always competent to show the nonexistence of a contract"). A contract may be void
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contract was obtained by mistake, fraud, or duress.55 Additionally, the parol
evidence rule does not apply to agreements made after the written contract
was entered into by the parties. 6
The first step in the application of the parol evidence rule is to
determine whether a valid contract was formed. This determination can be
made by examining any relevant evidence because the parol evidence rule
does not apply to the determination of whether a contract was validly
created." Second, if a valid contract was entered into, it must then be
determined if the written contract was the final expression of the agreement
between the parties.5 8 Once again, any relevant evidence may be used to
determine if the agreement was a final expression of the parties because the
parol evidence rule does not apply to this inquiry. 9 While the written
agreement does not have to be signed or be in any specific format to be
considered a final integrated agreement," "[t]he crucial requirement is that
the parties have regarded the writing as the final embodiment of their
agreement."6 Third, if the written contract was a final expression, it must
orvoidable because of an illegality. See CALAMAR&PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-7,
at 161.
55 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(d); see also CALAMARI
& PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-7(c)-(d), at 159-61; 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 47,
§ 7.5, at 236-45.56 See, e.g., H.C. Schmieding Produce Co. v. Cagle, 529 So. 2d 243,247 (Ala.
1988) (stating that the parol evidence rule under the UCC did not apply to a potato
sales contract entered subsequent to the formation of the written seed contract even
though some of the negotiations for the modification took place before the initial
contract was entered). The pertinent rules applied to agreements made after a
contract has been formed by the parties are the rules of contract modification. See
generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 5-14(a), at 262-64. For a
discussion of no-oral-modification clauses which require any subsequent agreement
modifying the contract to be written, see 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 7.6, at
246-51.57 See CALAMARI & PERLLO, supra note 1, § 3-7, at 157.
58 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 7.3, at 216. A final agreement between
the parties, whether partial or complete, is referred to as an "integrated agreement."
See id. § 7.3, at 217. This issue of integration is usually decided by the trial judge
as a matter of law. See CALAMARI &PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-3, at 143.
59 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(a).60 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 7.3, at 217.
61 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-3, at 143. The more complete the
written agreement is on its face, the more likely the agreement will be considered
a final integration. See id. If it is determined that the contract was not intended as
the final expression of the parties, the contract is "unintegrated," and the parol
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then be determined whether the written expression was a total or partial
expression of the agreement. 2 If the parties intended the written contract
to be a complete expression of all the terms of the agreement, the contract
is totally or completely integrated. 3 However, if the parties intended the
written contract to contain only some of the terms of the agreement, the
contract is partially integrated.'
There are many different approaches in determining whether a written
agreement is a total or partial integration. According to Williston's
approach, a merger clause stating that the writing is the total agreement
conclusively establishes the agreement as a total integration, unless the
agreement is obviously incomplete on its face or the merger clause was
obtained by fraud or mistake." However, if the agreement does not contain
a merger clause, the writing must be examined on its face to determine if
it is a partial or total integration. 6 Thus, according to Williston, if the
written agreement appears complete on its face, it is considered a total
integration, and if the agreement appears obviously incomplete on its face,
it is considered a partial integration.67 However, if the agreement appears
evidence rule does not apply to the contract. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 7.3,
at 215.62 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-4, at 145. Whether an agreement
is a partial or total integration is usually determined by the trial judge as an issue
of law. See id. The parol evidence rule does not apply when inquiring whether the
agreement is partially or totally integrated. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 214(b).
63 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-4, at 145.
6" See id.65 See 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 633 (1920); see also
Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The Sounds of
Silence, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 55-57 (1985). The First Restatement adopted
Williston's approach to determining whether an agreement is a partial or total
integration. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 240 (1932); CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-4(c), at 147.
66 See CALAMARI &PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-4(c), at 148.67 See, e.g., Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 126 A. 791,792 (Pa. 1924) (stating that
in determining whether an agreement is a total integration, "the writing will be
looked at, and if it appears to be a contract complete within itself, . . . 'it is
conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and
manner of their undertaking, were reduced to writing' " (quoting Seitz v. Brewers'
Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891))); Cumru Township Auth. v.
Snekul, Inc., 618 A.2d 1080, 1085-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (examining the face
of the document and concluding that because of the "thorough detailing of every
aspect of the entire understanding," the agreement was totally integrated).
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to be complete on its face, it is considered to be a partial integration if the
alleged additional terms would not naturally be included in the written
agreement due to the nature of the alleged additional agreement.6 8
Under Corbin's approach, the presence of a merger clause can be
considered, but is not conclusive.69 Additionally, in the inquiry of whether
the writing is a total integration, examining the face of the agreement alone
cannot determine the intent of the parties as to total integration?70 There-
fore, according to Corbin, all relevant evidence should be liberally admitted
to determine the actual intent of the parties concerning whether the writing
is a total or partial expression of their agreement.7
Under the collateral contract approach, terms that are collateral or
independent of the completely integrated underlying written agreement can
be admitted into evidence, unless the collateral terms contradict the
underlying agreement. 72 However, terms that relate to the main purpose of
68 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-4(c), at 148.
[W]hen a term not found in the writing is offered into evidence by one of
the parties and the court concludes that it would have been natural for the
parties situated as they were to have included that term in the writing, there
is a total integration with respect to that term and the term may not be
admitted into evidence even if it does not contradict the writing.
Id. Williston focuses on what reasonable persons would have done, rather than
inquiring into the actual intent of the parties. See MURRAY, supra note 45, § 84, at
389.
69 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-4(d), at 149 ("According to
Corbin, all relevant Evidence should be included on this issue of Intent, including
Evidence of prior negotiations.").
70 See id.
71 See, e.g., Bussard v. College of St. Thomas, Inc., 200 N.W. 2d 155, 161
(Minn. 1972) (stating that to determine whether a contract is totally integrated, "the
writing must be read in light of the situation of the parties, the subject matter and
the purposes ofthe transaction, and like attendant circumstances"). "In otherwords
the very evidence whose admissibility is challenged is admissible on the issue of
total integration." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-4(d), at 149. The
Second Restatement states that "a writing cannot of itself prove its own
completeness, and wide latitude must be allowed for inquiry into circumstances
bearing on the intention of the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 210 cmt. b (1981).
72 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 7.3, at 225. See also, e.g., Buyken v.
Ertner, 205 P.2d 628, 636 (Wash. 1949) (holding that an oral agreement was
admissible under the parol evidence rule because it covered a different topic than
the written agreement and the written agreement was not inconsistent with the oral
agreement). For a discussion of the narrow and broad views of the collateral
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the underlying agreement are excluded from evidence.' Therefore, under
this view, the presence or absence of a merger clause is not critical. While
this approach is not used widely today, it continues to be applied.74
2. The Effect of a Merger Clause on the Determination
of Whether There is a Completely Integrated Agreement
Under the common law, it may be uncertain how the court will
interpret the parties' intent as to the integration issue. Therefore, the parties
often insert a merger clause in the agreement stating that the written
agreement "is a final expression of all the terms agreed upon and is a
complete and exclusive statement of those terms. '75 Traditionally, courts
have followed Williston's approach and have held that agreements
containing merger clauses are completely integrated unless the document
is facially incomplete, or the merger clause was included because of fraud
or mistake.76 Additionally, courts have reasoned that because "complete
contract approach, see CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-4(b), at 147.
73 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 7.3, at 225.
See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-4(b), at 147; see, e.g., Alabama
Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Haynes, 497 So. 2d 82, 85 (Ala. 1986) (holding
that an oral agreement regarding workers' compensation coverage was admissible
under the parol evidence rule because the workers' compensation issue was
collateral to the written homeowner's insurance contract).
75 CALAMARI &PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-6, at 156. It is important to note that
all of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule apply to an agreement even if the
agreement contains a merger clause. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 7.3, at
206 n.36; see also supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing the
exceptions to the parol evidence rule).
Some courts have held that merger clauses should not be interpreted literally in
collective bargaining agreements because "no writing could ever embody the
'entire agreement' between a company, a union, and the individual employees."
Matthew J. McDermott, Labor Law-Between the Obvious and the Foolish: An
Application of UCC Principles to the Common Law of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 337, 355 (1995); see also Manville Forest
Prod. Corp. v. Paperworkers Int'l Union, 831 F.2d 72, 76 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating
that "[i]n regard to the 'no modification' clause, this Court has repeatedly held that
such clauses do not prevent an arbitrator from looking to past practice").
76 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-6, at 156; 2 FARNSWORTH,
supra note 47, § 7.3, at 206 n.36; see also Hoover Universal, Inc. v. Brockway
Imco, Inc., 809 F.2d 1039, 1043 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the contract was
integrated because ofthe "detailed nature of the contract, including the well-drafted
merger clause"); Durkee v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 676 F. Supp. 189, 191
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integration depends on the parties' intention, . . . merger clauses [are]
conclusive evidence that the agreement is completely integrated." 7
Modernly, however, "[tihere is now some authority that a merger clause is
only one of the factors to be considered in determining whether there is a
total integration. 78 Another modem approach is to hold a merger clause
effective only if the parties actually discussed and consciously agreed upon
the insertion of the clause.79
Therefore, the presence or absence of a merger clause can be a factor
courts use to determine whether the writing is a total integration, thereby
determining if the parol evidence rule is invoked to exclude extrinsic
evidence. It must be cautioned, however, that sometimes courts will blend
or mix the criteria used under the various approaches, resulting in an
application that does not precisely fit into any of the various views.
III. EFFECT OF A BINDING PAST PRACTICE
After the parties have reached a basic agreement in bargaining, the
company and the union often agree to insert a merger clause in the
collective bargaining agreement. At a later time, one of the parties may
attempt to use this clause to defend its action of unilaterally discontinuing
a past practice not contained in the agreement. Before discussing the
(W.D. Wis. 1987) (concluding that the agreement was completely integrated
because the contract contained "a &lear and comprehensive merger clause").
" Macintosh, supra note 4, at 530.
78 CALAMARI &PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-6, at 156; see Franklin v. White, 493
N.E. 2d 161, 166 (Ind. 1986) (holding that a merger clause should be "considered
as any other contract provision to determine the intention of the parties"); 2
FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 7.3, at 205-07.
79 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, § 3-6, at 156; see also Seibel v.
Layne & Bowler, Inc., 641 P.2d 668, 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that an
inconspicuous merger clause did not exclude an oral warranty because the parties
did not actually intend such a result).
Under the UCC, courts have generally held that a merger clause effectively
excludes extrinsic evidence. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 111; see
also Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39,44-46 (D.S.C.
1974) (excluding a prior written warranty because the written sales contract
contained a merger clause). However, courts have held inconspicuous merger
clauses ineffective. See, e.g., Sierra Diesel Injection Serv., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,
874 F.2d 653, 657 (holding that the merger clause was not conclusive evidence of
total integration where the clause was not conspicuous), amended and superseded
on denial ofreh'g by 890 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1989).
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insertion of a merger clause in a labor agreement, the concept of a past
practice must be explored.
According to Elkouri and Elkouri, past practice is "one of the most
significant factors in labor-management arbitration.""0 Past practice refers
to "a prior course of conduct which is consistently made in response to a
recurring situation and which the parties regard as the correct and required
response under the circumstances."" Past practice can be used to interpret
ambiguous contract language and to enforce general contract language and
can even become an implied contract term.82 The United States Supreme
Court recognized the binding effect of past practice in United Steelworkers
ofAmerica v. Warrior & GulfNavigation Co. 3 in 1960, stating "[t]he labor
arbitrator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the
contract, as the industrial common law-the practice of the industry and the
shop-is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not
expressed in it."84
There is no set standard for determining if a binding past practice
exists. 5 A frequently cited test for determining the existence of a binding
80 FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 630
(5th ed. 1997).
8! GRENIG & ESTES, supra note 6, § 6.45.
82 See id.; MARVIN F. HILL & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
38-39 (1989).
3 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
84 Id. at 581-82; see also Metal Specialty Co. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, Local 1089,39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1265, 1269 (1962) (Volz, Arb.).
[Contractual relationship between the parties normally consists of more
than the written word. Day-to-day practices mutually accepted by the
parties may attain the status of contractual rights and duties, particularly
where they are not at variance with any written provision negotiated into the
contract by the parties and where they are of long standing and were not
changed during contract negotiations.
Id.
85 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 80, at 632. Parties may expressly ensure
the continuance of past practices with a contract clause. See id. at 646-47. But see
Bethlehem Pac. Coast Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 1069, 17
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 382 (1951) (Miller, Arb.) (holding that the employer could
discontinue the past practice of retaining third shift assignments on certain jobs
regardless of a clause stating that past practices were to be continued). See
generally BAER, supra note 3, at 14-15 (outlining the general guidelines followed
by arbitrators in determining the effectiveness of clauses attempting to ensure the
continuation of past practices); 1 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION §
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past practice was enunciated by Arbitrator Jules J. Justin in Celanese Corp.
ofAmerica v. Textile Workers Union, Local 1093.86 Arbitrator Justin stated
that a binding past practice must be "(1) unequivocal; (2) clearly enunci-
ated and acted upon; [and] (3) readily ascertainable over a reasonable
period of time as a fixed and established practice accepted by both
Parties."87 Generally, arbitrators have required that a binding past practice
be clear and accepted by both parties for a sufficient period of time.88
Arbitrator Richard Mittenthal set forth elements he felt were required to
establish a binding past practice, including clarity and consistency,
longevity and repetition, acceptability, underlying circumstances, and
mutuality.89 A party may assent to a past practice by acquiescing in the
conduct over time.9" Many issues arise regarding binding past practices
which are outside the subject matter of this paper, including the scope of
the past practice9' and the subject matter appropriate for a binding past
practice. 92 Additionally, even if a past practice has been successfully
established and binds the parties, it may be terminated by specific
agreement of the parties. 3
18.03[4] (Tim Bornstein et al. eds., 1997) (discussing the impact of a maintenance-
of-benefits clause on past practices).86 Celanese Corp. of Am. v. Textile Workers Union, Local 1093, 24 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 168 (1954) (Justin, Arb.).87 Id. at 172.
88 See, e.g., WPLG TV v. Photographers, Local 666, F.M.C.S. No. 92-06073,
1993 WL 788164, at *18 (June 15, 1993) (Abrams, Arb.) (stating that "[i]n order
to be binding, a practice must be clearly understood and based on conduct that is
repeated over time").
89 See Richard Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective
Bargaining Agreements, in ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 32-33 (Spencer D. Pollard ed., 1961); see also HILL & SINICROPI,
supra note 82, at 22-31 (discussing these factors in detail).
" See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 1374,33 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 374, 376 (1959) (Valtin, Arb.) (stating that a party's assent may
be implied where a past practice has continued pervasively over a long period of
time).
9' See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 80, at 633.
92 See id. at 633-41 (discussing various theories as to what topics may become
binding past practices).
" See id. at 644. Also, a party may take actions to guard against abuse of the
past practice, alter or eliminate the past practice to promote safety concerns, or
eliminate the past practice if the underlying circumstances have changed. See id.
at 642-45. A past practice may even by eliminated by "its gradual discontinuance
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Management or labor unions may seek to eliminate binding past
practices by obtaining an agreement for the insertion of certain language
in the collective bargaining agreement. A merger or integration clause
stating that the agreement is the total agreement of the parties is the most
common clause used to defend against a binding past practice.
94
IV. FACTORS IMPACTING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF A MERGER CLAUSE'S ELIMINATION OF A BINDING PAST PRACTICE
While arbitrators have attempted to formulate bright line rules, "many
factors operate, perhaps in combination, to make each decision of an
arbitrator relatively unique."'95 In order to determine the effect of a merger
clause on past practices, over one hundred arbitration decisions, published
and unpublished, were examined. The various factors which arbitrators
relied upon in these decisions in determining the effectiveness of a merger
clause in this situation will be discussed.96 Assuming a valid past practice
has been established, some of the factors impacting on successful exclusion
of such past practices by a merger clause include: the contract language, 97
over a period of time." Id. at 644 (citing Bethlehem Steel Co., 37 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) at 958).94 See, e.g., George E. Failing Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 4800,
93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 598, 602 (1989) (Fox, Arb.) (holding that an integration
clause stating that all previous agreements were eliminated and that no future
agreements may bind the parties unless written precluded the company's reliance
on a past practice). A management rights clause has also been successfully used to
fight off the binding effect of a past practice. See, e.g., City of Tampa v.
Hillsborough County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1169,
1173 (1980) (Wahl, Arb.) (holding that management could alter a past practice
where, inter alia, a management rights clause stated that management retained its
"rights . . . to 'alter or vary past practices"' (quoting collective bargaining
agreement)).
95 BAER, supra note 3, at 9-10.
Consequently, an arbiter may, on a particular occasion, assert an absolute
doctrine that the practices and customs of the parties, in the language they
choose to adopt, actually represents the true agreement between them. This
same arbiter may turn around on another occasion and declare with no less
conviction that his view of past practice is that it cannot alter the meaning
of a clear contract provision.
Id.
96See infra notes 102-268 and accompanying text. Only those cases that contain
a significant discussion of the arbitrator's reasoning will be discussed.
97See infra notes 102-84 and accompanying text
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whether the past practice has continued unabated into the new contract
period,98 the bargaining history on the subject,99 whether there was an
ambiguous contractual provision related to the subject matter of the past
practice,"° and the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. 10'
A. Contract Language
Elkouri and Elkouri state that the binding effect of past practices "may
be eliminated if the [merger clause] contract language is quite strong."102
The question remains, however, what is strong language? This section
summarizes various arbitration decisions reflecting what types of merger
clause language have the effect of eliminating the binding effect of a past
practice. First, Part 1 will explore the effect of using the term "past
practice" or "practices" in the contract clause. Then, Part 2 will examine
clear and unequivocal merger clause language that does not use the term
"past practices" or "practices."
1. Use of the Term "Practices" or
"Past Piactices " in the Merger Clause
The survey of decisions revealed that, generally, when the term "past
practices" or "practices" was specifically referenced in the merger clause,
the clause would effectively eliminate the past practice. However, if there
was a separate contract clause on the topic of the past practice that could
be construed as ambiguous, the past practice could still be used to interpret
the ambiguous language, regardless of the specific merger clause.
In Oxford Paper Co. v. United Papermakers, Local 19,'03 Arbitrator
Dworkin relied heavily on the language of the contract clause in his
decision to exclude the past practice. In Oxford Paper Co., the employer
assigned cutting work to male employees which had in the past been done
by women."M The Union argued that the employer was bound by the past
practice and should have recalled laid-off female employees rather than
assigning the work to male employees. The employer argued that the
98See infra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
99See infra notes 207-41 and accompanying text.
'oSee infra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
'o' See infra notes 250-68 and accompanying text.
102 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 80, at 645 (emphasis added in part).
103 Oxford Paper Co. v. United Papermakers, Local 19, 44 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 630 (n.d.) (Dworkin, Arb.).
104 See id. at 631.
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contract language did not require it to recall the women and that the work
could be assigned to anyone it wished.' Section A of article VII of the
contract stated: "The plain meaning of this agreement and other agreements
signed upon the effective date of this Labor Agreement and hereafter shall
control and be binding upon the parties to the agreement, to the exclusion
of past practices and past oral agreement."'" Arbitrator Dworkin
concluded that the past practice was not binding because it was excluded
by the contract clause.'0 7 Arbitrator Dworkin appeared to rely solely on the
language of the clause in excluding the past practice. He pointed to the use
of the term "past practice" by quoting the language of the clause and
italicizing the phrase "to the exclusion of past practices."'018 Thus,
Arbitrator Dworkin concluded that "[t]his language clearly manifests the
intent to eliminate the binding effect of past practices."'0 9
The arbitrator in McGraw-Edison Power Systems Division v. Interna-
tional Ass "n ofMachinists, Lodge 1234'1° held that the extensive contract
clause specifically using the term "past practice" effectively eliminated the
binding force of the past practice under the agreement." I The employer
banned transistor radio use in the plant after it had allowed radios in the
plant for over twenty years."2 The contract contained the following merger
or integration clause:
"No agreement, waiver or modification of any of the provisions hereof
shall be binding on the parties unless executed in writing by the parties.
Waiver or lack of enforcement of any understanding herein or of any
disciplinary or other rule in any particular case shall not constitute a
precedent unless the parties stipulate in writing that it does establish a
precedent.
It is agreed and understood that any and all agreement[s], written and
verbal, entered into between the parties hereto are cancelled and
superceded by this agreement. There are no side agreements or verbal
understandings relative to this agreementand the presentcontractbetween
the parties is as set forth in this agreement .... Unless specifically so
105 See id.
" Id. at 631-32 (emphasis added).
107 See id. at 634.
108 Id.
109 Id.
Io McGraw-Edison Power Sys. Div. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
Lodge 1234, 53 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1024 (1969) (Lewis, Arb.).
.. See id. at 1027.
12 See id. at 1024.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
provided in this contract to the contrary, past practices shall not be
binding on either party. 1
3
Arbitrator Lewis concluded that the clause excluded the past practice from
binding the employer, stating that "[t]his language was hammered out by
the parties at the bargaining table and it would seem to us that in the
absence of any memorandum of understanding to the contrary the
Company would have a right to issue a rule banning the use of transistor
radios," unless the company's actual purpose was discriminatory." 4 The
contract clause, which specifically stated that "past practices shall not be
binding on eitherparty,"11 could not have been more clear and unambigu-
ous. Thus, the clause was controlling.
In Union Camp Corp. v. United Paperworks International Union,
Local 388,16 the arbitrator held that a contract clause effectively eliminated
the past practice. 17 The agreement in Union Camp contained a provision
requiring any workforce reductions to be determined by seniority."8
However, there had been a practice of ignoring this provision when
determining who to layoff during short-term "partial operation" layoffs of
one or two days." 9 The following clause was inserted in the agreement: 20
"This Agreement contains the full and complete Agreement on all
bargaining issues between the parties.
Any side agreements, memoranda of understanding of any kind,
written or oral, and any pastpractices which are not incorporated into this
Agreement are null and void.
"3 Id. at 1025 (quoting the collective bargaining agreement) (emphasis added).
114Id. at 1027.
"I Id. at 1025 (emphasis added).
116 Union Camp Corp. v. United Paperworks Int'l Union, Local 388, F.M.C.S.
No. 93-18279, 1994 WL 836436 (Feb. 14, 1994) (Nolan, Arb.). Other arbitration
decisions have excluded a past practice where the contract clause specifically used
the term "past practice." See, e.g., Preferred Coupled Hose Prods. v. Aluminum
Workers Int'l Union, Local 119, F.M.C.S. No. 94-12123, 1995 WL 594611 (Feb.
16, 1995) (Heekin, Arb.) (involving a past practice of paying employees vacation
pay where they did not meet the service requirement because the past practice was
not properly established and the agreement contained a merger clause that
specifically stated that "prior practices" were canceled by the agreement).
"7 See Union Camp, 1994 WL 836436, at *7.
118 See id. at *3.
"19 See id.
"'
20 Arbitrator Nolan referred to this clause as a "zipper clause." See id. How-
ever, the clause actually appears to be a merger clause.
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There are and shall be no other Agreements except as enumerated
herein, or may be agreed upon during the contract term of the Agreement.
Any such Agreements that are made during the contract term shall be
reduced to writing and signed by the parties."' 2'
After the merger clause was inserted in the new agreement, an incident
occurred where four of six employees were laid-off temporarily for
nondisciplinary reasons." Rather than laying off the employees in order
of seniority, the supervisor asked for two volunteers to stay and continue
to work and four workers were sent home."2 The union argued that the
merger clause eliminated the past practice of allowing the employer to
determine short-term layoffs without regard to seniority, and thus, the
contract provision governing seniority was violated. 124 Holding that the
merger clause did eliminate the past practice, Arbitrator Nolan stated,
"Where the contract is clear on its face and the party challenging that clear
meaning fails to prove an alternative intention, obviously the plain meaning
has to control. Here the contract unqualifiedly applies seniority to layoffs
and eliminates contrary practices."'" Claiming that it did not intend to
eliminate this specific past practice, 26 the company argued that after the
merger clause was negotiated, the company proposed a two-day rule for
temporary layoffs not requiring seniority to be considered. 27 The union
refused and the company withdrew the proposal assuming that the past
practice survived. 2 Arbitrator Nolan, however, examined the negotiating
history and noted that it was unclear whether the discussion regarding the
two-day rule proposal occurred before or after the merger clause discus-
sion.' He concluded that
[a] murky negotiating history is no reason to believe the parties did not
mean what they said, or that they could not have written what they really
meant.
'. Id. at *4 (quoting the collective bargaining agreement) (emphasis added).
In See id. at * 1-2.
,23 See id. at *2.
124 See id. at *4.
12-Id. at *9-10.
126 See id. at *5.
27 See id. at *6.
' See id.
129 See id.
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I must therefore find that the zipper clause means exactly what it
says-that is, the 1986 Agreement wiped out all side agreements and past
practices that the parties did not expressly protect. 30
Arbitrator Nolan noted that the parties had discussed past practices they
wished to protect from the merger clause and that this practice was not
brought up by either party. Additionally, he stated that there was "no proof
of the Union's devious intentions" and that "the more likely explanation is
that the Union was happy to let the Company accidently eliminate a
practice the Union disliked."'31 Therefore, Arbitrator Nolan appeared to
weigh heavily the agreed-upon language between the parties in excluding
the past practice, regardless of the fact that the employer may have
misunderstood what practices would be eliminated by the merger clause.
While it appears that the use of the term "past practice" provides clear
and unambiguous proof of the parties' intentions to eliminate past
practices, some arbitrators have held that past practices are not eliminated
by a specific contract clause containing the word "past practices." For
example, even the clearest contract language will not eliminate a past
practice used to interpret ambiguous contractual provisions. 32 In Edmont
13 Old. at *7.
131 Id. at *6.
13 2 See, e.g., Spartan Stores, Inc. v. General Teamsters Union, Local 406, 105
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 549, 550 (1995) (Kanner, Arb.) (refusing to exclude a past
practice under a very specific contract clause entitled "Past Practices," reasoning
that the "so-called 'zipper' provision does not preclude consideration of extrinsic
evidence of past contract language and contract negotiations if the subject contract
provision is ambiguous"); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Municipality of
Anchorage, A.A.A. No. 75-L390-0253-91, 1992 WL 717751, at *19 (June 15,
1992) (Runkel, Arb.) (holding that a contract clause entitled "Exclusive Nature of
Agreement" that explicitly used the word "practices" did not exclude the past
practice because the issue involved "the parties' interpretation of the contract and
not as a matter of unrelated past practice"). In International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 1547 v. Municipality ofAnchorage, 1993 WL 788749
(Oct. 21, 1993) (Henner, Arb.), the arbitrator held that a past practice was not
excluded by a specific contract clause using the term "practice" because
[a]lthough arbitrators are bound by such zipper clauses, as they are by any
other language agreed to by the parties, such clauses generally are not
viewed as a barrier to an arbitrator's effort to understand the parties' intent
in the meaning of the agreed-upon words.
Arbitrators recognize such zipper clauses as excluding from
consideration past practice and other arrangements made between the
parties but not reflected in the agreement. Nonetheless, arbitrators must
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Wilson v. United Rubber Workers, Local 688,133 Arbitrator Nichols held
that a contract clause did not eliminate the past practice that five days
notice was required to qualify for vacation severance pay where the
agreement stated that employees who were discharged or who quit "without
notice" would not qualify for vacation severance pay.134 Arbitrator Nichols
stated:
It is abundantly clear that the parties adopted this close-out clause as a
means of eliminating side agreements and understandings affecting
matters not covered by this contract. That, however, does not negate
understandings or practices which interpret and apply language which
was negotiated by the parties and which is a part of the Agreement which
they have entered into as the guide lines for their mutual relationships
during the term of the Agreement.135
In Union Local Board of Education v. Union Local, Local 283,136
Arbitrator Fullmer held that the merger clause did not exclude the past
practice because the contract clause was ambiguous. 37 After a new contract
have evidence of the parties' understanding of the contract language in
order to issue a decision based on that language, even with the presence of
a zipper clause.
Id. at *2. But see Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Construction Laborers, Local 185, 108
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 587,591 (1997) (Staudohar, Arb.) (excluding apast practice
of not allowing probationary employees to receive holiday pay even though there
was a contract clause on holiday pay that could have been construed as ambiguous,
stating that "[t]he zipper clause bars consideration of any past understandings that
may have existed to deny this benefit").
133 Edmont Wilson v. United Rubber Workers, Local 688, 54 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 686 (1970) (Nichols, Arb.).
114 See id. at 687. Article XV of the agreement stated: "The Parties by this
Agreement have set forth their entire understanding on all matters which are or
may be properly subject for collective bargaining, and by this Agreement do
invalidate and supersede except as provided in Appendix One attached hereto, all
previous written or oral understandings, agreements, practices." Id. (emphasis
added).
131 Id. at 688.
136 Union Local Bd. of Educ. v. Union Local, Local 283, A.A.A. No. 52-390-
00162-95, 1995 WL 793768 (Dec. 28, 1995) (Fullmer, Arb.).
137 See id. at *6. The contract clause stated: "This agreement supersedes and
cancels all previous agreements, verbal or written, or based on alleged past
practices, between the Board and the Union and constitutes the entire agreement
between the parties." Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
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was in effect, the employer, despite no changes in the contract language,
denied extra trips exceeding sixty miles to regular bus drivers when the
employer determined that the regular driver's schedule conflicted with the
trip."'38 However, a past practice had been to choose drivers for these extra
trips exceeding sixty miles based on seniority and to accommodate their
schedule regardless of a conflict. 139 The term in the agreement stating
"[c]onsideration for extra trips" was held to be ambiguous. 40 Arbitrator
Fullmer stated that "[i]fthe terms are ambiguous, resort may be had to such
aids to interpretation as past practice and bargaining history."' 4' Arbitrator
Fullmer pointed out that the merger clause "would obviously be sufficient
to extinguish any 'free standing' agreement based on a past practice. An
example would be a customary free Thanksgiving turkey awarded by an
employer without any basis in the written agreement."'4
Other arbitrators have noted the absence of the term "past practice" in
the merger clause as a reason for not excluding the past practice. 43 In
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Communications Workers of
America,'" the arbitrator held that the past practices of paying taxi fares for
women who worked past midnight and providing meals for certain
employees who worked two or more hours of overtime were not eliminated
by a merger clause. 45 Article 34 of the agreement stated:
"Section 1. This Agreement... [and other Agreements specifically
listed] ... set forth all of the understandings, commitments and agree-
ments [existing] between the Company and the Union, and it is agreed
that the Company and the Union shall not be bound by any understand-
ings, commitments or agreements not included therein.
Section 2. If agreements are made between the Company and the
Union modifying the provisions of the Agreements set forth in Section 1
'
38 See id. at * 1-2.
139 See id.
140 See id. at *2.
141 Id. at *5.
142 Id. at *7.
143 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Flight Attendants, No. 36-18-2-50-
94, 1995 WL 862215, at *17-19 (Oct. 9, 1995) (Levak, Arb.) (holding that the
contract clause did not exclude the past practice because the previous agreement
contained a substantially similar merger clause under which the past practice was
allowed and noting that the merger clause did not mention the word "past
practices" specifically).
' Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of Am., 50
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 417 (1968) (Duff et al., Arbs.).
141 See id. at 418.
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above, or covering conditions not contained in these Agreements, they
shall not be binding on either the Company or Union unless reduced to
writing in the form of an addition or amendment to these Agreements and
signed by the parties hereto. This Section shall not be construed as
relieving either party from obligations assumed in the settlement of a
grievance; however, no grievance settlement shall have any binding
application beyond the particular employee or employees for whom the
grievance is presented unless the settlement is adopted by the Company
and Union through collective bargaining and reduced to writing in the
form of an addition or amendment to these Agreements."'
14 6
Arbitrator Duff carefully examined the language of article 34 which stated
that "understandings, commitments, or agreements" shall not bind the
parties if not included in the agreement. 47 Arbitrator Duff concluded, "In
our opinion, it is significant that the words 'past practice' or its equivalent
are not used anywhere in the Agreement. If the parties desire to rule out
past practices as being a part of their working agreement, it could have
been easily accomplished.' ' 14 Thus, the arbitrator concluded that past
practices were not intended to be governed by article 34. A dissenting,
company-appointed arbitrator stated:
The Chairman's statement that the term "practices" is not within the
contemplation of the terms "understanding, commitments, or agreements"
not only negates the intent of the parties as revealed in the bargaining
history, but also runs contra to the meaning of the term "practice" as it is
used in the Labor-Management Relations field. Thus, arbitrators,
including the Chairman in other cases, have consistently given effect only
to those practices which may be said to be either the product of a joint
"understanding" or which, because of their uniformity and consistency,
give rise to the inference that they constitute an "understanding."' 149
While arbitrators do not normally read merger clauses as strictly as
Arbitrator Duff, he may have tried to find a reason to disallow the
withdrawal of these minimal benefits for employees who worked such long
hours for the benefit of their employer.
"'
46 Id. at 419 (quoting the collective bargaining agreement).
147 See id. at 421.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 424-25 (Duff, Arb., dissenting).
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2. Clear and Unequivocal Merger Clause Language
Without the Term "Practices" or "Past Practices"
Contrary to the illustrative cases of the preceding section, the term
"past practice" is not necessary for a merger clause to effectively eliminate
a past practice. As a matter of fact, the term is usually not included in such
clauses because the use of the merger clause to eliminate a past practice is
often an afterthought by the employer or the union. Arbitrators have held
that the following clauses effectively eliminated past practices without
containing the term "past practices" or "practices":
Example 1-
"This Agreement contains all of the provisions agreed upon by
the Company and the Union. All prior agreements and understand-
ings, unless written and signed by both the company and the Union,
shall terminate upon execution of this Agreement. No amendments
or modifications of this Agreement shall be valid unless it is agreed
to by the Company and the Union and reduced to writing."0
Example 2-
"No agreement, alteration, understanding, variation, waiver or
modification of any of the terms or conditions or covenants contained
herein shall be made by any employee or group of employees with
the Company and in no case shall it be binding upon the parties
hereto unless such Agreement is made and executed in writing
between the parties hereto and same has been ratified by the
Union." 151
Example 3-
"This Agreement is the entire Agreement between the Employer
and the Union. The parties acknowledge that they have fully
bargained with respect to all terms and conditions of employment and
have settled them for the duration of this Agreement. This Agreement
terminates all prior agreements and understandings either verbal or
in writing except as provided in B below, and concludes collective
bargaining for the duration of this Agreement.
'
50Hubbel Indus. Controls v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 1825,
100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 350,351 (1992) (Talarico, Arb.) (quoting the collective
bargaining agreement).
'.. Micro Precision Gear & Mach. Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
Local Lodge 439,42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 165 (1964) (Klein, Arb.) (quoting the
collective bargaining agreement).
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Letters ofAgreement or other contract modifications entered into
prior to the effective date of this Agreement shall terminate thirty
(30) days subsequent to the effective date of this Agreement (except
as otherwise specified in this Agreement), unless expressly renewed
in writing by the parties."' 5 2
Example 4-
"This contract represents complete collective bargaining and full
agreement by the parties in respect to rate of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment which shall prevail
during the term hereof and any matters or subjects not herein covered
have been satisfactorily adjusted, compromised or waived by the
parties for the life of this agreement."'
5 3
Example 5-
"This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement of the parties
superceding and invalidating any previous commitments of any kind,
for the duration of this agreement."'
5 4
Example 6-
"In reaching this agreement, all parties hereto have fully
exercised and complied with any and all obligations to bargain and
have fully considered and explored all subjects and matters in any
way material to the relationship between the parties. In negotiating
and consummating this contract, all matters concerning which the
parties could contract have been considered and disposed of. This
contract expresses, embodies and includes the full and complete
agreement between the parties, for the full term hereof and shall not
during such term be reopened. This agreement supersedes any
previous agreements between the parties."' 55
252 Alaska v. Alaska State Employees Ass'n AFSCME, Local 52, 1992 WL
725777, at *4 (Sept. 29, 1992) (Levak, Arb.) (quoting the collective bargaining
agreement).
" Bassick Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 229, 26 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 627,630 (1956) (Kheel, Arb.) (quoting the collective bargaining
agreement).
114 Midwest Dental Prods. Corp. v. Tool & Die Makers, Local 113, 94 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 467, 468 (1990) (Wies, Arb.) (quoting the collective bargaining
agreement).
25' Lone Star Brewing Co. v. International Union of Brewery Workers, Local
110, 53 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1317, 1317-18 (1969) (Autrey, Arb.) (quoting the
collective bargaining agreement).
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Example one was the contract clause used by the employer in Hubbel
Industrial Controls v. International Association of Machinists, Local
1825156 to defend its action of unilaterally denying payment to union shop
committee members'for their time spent handling grievances after the
employer had paid the members for such activities for over thirty years.'
Arbitrator Talarico stated that the language of the merger clause was "clear
and unambiguous" and concluded that the language excluded the past
practice. 5 Additionally, while noting that in cases such as this one where
language is clear and unambiguous it is not necessary to examine the
bargaining history, he stated that the parties engaged in give-and-take
bargaining prior to adopting the merger clause. 159
Example two was the clause used in Micro Precision Gear & Machine
Corp. v. International Association of Machinists, Local Lodge 439160 to
eliminate the binding effect of the past practice of promoting employees by
seniority when skill and ability were comparatively equal. 161 After noting
that nothing in the collective bargaining agreement required the company
to promote based on seniority, Arbitrator Klein stated:
In view of the precise language of Article XIX, it is clear that the
obligations of the Company under this Contract cannot be modified by
verbal representations or by past practice; nor can a waiver of a contrac-
tual right by either the Company or Union on one occasion establish a
binding precedent as to the future. 162
Example three was the merger clause used in Alaska v. Alaska State
Employees Ass "n AFSCME, Local 52163 by the State to defend its action of
discontinuing a past practice of paying overtime pay for hours exceeding
37.5 hours per week to certain Department of Transportation and Public
Facilities employees who were exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act
56 Hubbel Indus. Controls v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 1825,
100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 350 (1992) (Talarico, Arb.).
157 See id. at 351-52.
158 See id. at 353.
159 See id.
160 Micro Precision Gear & Mach. Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
Local Lodge 439,42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 165 (1964) (Klein, Arb.).
161 See id. at 166, 168.
162Id. at 168.
163 Alaska v. Alaska State Employees Ass'n AFSCME, Local 52, 1992 WL
725777 (Sept. 29, 1992) (Levak, Arb.).
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("FLSA").'1 Arbitrator Levak held that the contract clause excluded the
past practice. 6 After citing Elkouri and Elkouri's language regarding
strong contract language eliminating past practice, Arbitrator Levak stated,
"Article 37.A and 37.B are quite strongly written. Indeed, it is difficult to
see how they could have been any more strongly written."'"
Example four was the clause used in Bassick Co. v. International
Union of Electrical Workers, Local 229167 to defend the employers
unilateral action of discontinuing payment of anonproductive group bonus
to certain employees.168 Arbitrator Kheel stated that he agreed with the
basic principle that an established past practice may become part of the
contract despite a contractual clause prohibiting it, but that
each case must be viewed in light of the specific language of the contract
involved. In my opinion the contract between the parties in this case
expressly prohibits the implication that the non-incentive group bonus
became incorporated in the contract.... I do not see how it would be
possible to hold that a bonus not expressly covered by the contract
nevertheless became incorporated in the contract in face of the language
above quoted .... 69
Example five was the concise merger clause used in Midwest Dental
Products Corp. v. Tool & Die Makers, Local 113 170 to exclude the twenty-
year past practice of issuing paychecks weekly and paying vacation pay in
advance.17 1 This is proof that an effective merger clause does not have to
be lengthy. Arbitrator Wies held that the clause eliminated the binding
effect of the past practice and stated that the contract clause was "clear and
unambiguous."'72
I I See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (19 94); Alaska State Employees Ass'n AFSCME, Local
52, 1992 WL 725777, at *1.
16s See Alaska State Employees Ass "n AFSCME, Local 52, 1992 WL 725777,
at *13.
166 Id. at *12.
167 Bassick Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 229, 26 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 627 (1956) (Kheel, Arb.).
'
68 See id. at 627.
,
69Id. at 629-30.
171 Midwest Dental Prods. Corp. v. Tool &Die Makers, Local 113,94 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 467 (1990) (Wies, Arb.).
171 See id. at 468-69, 472.
172Id. at 472.
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The sixth and final example given above was the contract clause used
in Lone Star Brewing Co. v. International Union of Brewery Workers,
Local 110.'13 This clause appears different from the other clauses because
the parties combined both a zipper clause dealing with the duty to bargain
and a merger clause attempting to totally integrate the agreement. 74 This
contract clause was effective to allow the company to unilaterally
discontinue the past practice of paying a "Driver-Salesman Safety
Award."'' Arbitrator Autrey reasoned that "this case must be decided on
the very clear and unequivocal language of the collective bargaining
agreement which the parties entered into."'76
In the cases discussed above, the language of the clause was a primary
factor in the arbitrators' decisions. Often, however, other reasons were
stated. Generally, arbitrators have held that if there is clear and unambigu-
ous language on point, that is sufficient to eliminate the past practice. In
such cases, arbitrators will often not examine bargaining history and/or
specific circumstances.' However, in Elberta Crate & Box Co. v.
International Woodworkers ofAmerica, LocalS-181,"I Arbitrator Murphy
stated that the language of the clause alone is not enough to eliminate a past
practice and that the bargaining history and the pattern of circumstances
must also be examined.' In Elberta Crate & Box Co., the employer
unilaterally eliminated a past practice of allowing employees to eat their
lunches while working and required employees to take a half-hour lunch
without pay.' Arbitrator Murphy held that the past practice was binding
on the employer and was not excluded by the existence of the merger
clause. 8' Arbitrator Murphy reasoned:
In the face of such an established usage the plain management prerogative
clause and the clause that this is the "entire understanding" between the
1 Lone Star Brewing Co. v. International Union of Brewery Workers, Local
110, 53 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1317 (1969) (Autrey, Arb.).
'
7 4 See id. at 1317-18.
175 See id. at 1319-20.
1761d. at 1320.
177 See Hubbel Indus. Controls v. International Ass'n ofMachinists, Local 1825,
100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 350, 353 (1992) (Talarico, Arb.); supra notes 156-59
and accompanying text (discussing Hubbel Indus. Controls, 100 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) at 351).
7'Elberta Crate &Box Co. v. International Woodworkers ofAm., Local S-181,
32 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 228 (1959) (Murphy, Arb.).
179 See id. at 233.
0 See id. at 228-29.
"8! See id. at 233.
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parties is not enough to prevent this past practice from becoming a
definite part of the Agreement. Those clauses have their specialized
meanings to be sure, but they by themselves are not enough to defeat such
a history and pattern of circumstances as exists in this case. My feeling is
that there would have been no doubt that both parties would have argued
against eliminating this past practice by an express provision in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement had the matter been brought up for
discussion during the negotiation of the present Collective Bargaining
Agreement.'
82
Arbitrator Murphy appeared to stress the employees' reliance on this
benefit and was reluctant to eliminate it.' 83 Thus, he ignored the language
of the clause and looked to the absence of give-and-take bargaining
between the parties over the insertion of the merger clause.184 This decision
illustrates that while the language of a clause is a primary factor as to its
effectiveness, arbitrators may explore other factors that justify their
decision. The remainder of this section will discuss these other factors.
B. Past Practice Continuing Unabated into the New Contract Period
Whether a past practice continued unabated into the new contract term
under a merger agreement is often a factor scrutinized by arbitrators in
determining whether to exclude the binding effect of the past practice. One
view is that a past practice is not binding if the contract contained a broad
integration clause and the past practices do not continue into the new
contract term.185 If a past practice continues into the new contract period,
there are two views as to the effectiveness of a merger clause. First, the
past practice is not canceled by the contract language because the fact that
the practice continued unabated proves that the parties did not intend to
discontinue the practice. 186 Second, the past practice is canceled even
182 Id.
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 See HILL & SINICROPI, supra note 82, at 58-59.
186 See id. at 59-60. In Warren City Board of Education, Arbitrator Heeking
held that a past practice granting leave for attendance of an education association
assembly was not eliminated by a merger clause. See Warren City Bd. of Educ. v.
Warren Educ. Ass'n, A.A.A. No. 53-390-00673-92, 1993 WL 788645, at *4-5, *8
(Sept. 24,1993) (Heeking,Arb.). ArbitratorHeeking reasoned that thepastpractice
could be used to clarify ambiguous contract language, but also stated that "once a
past practice has been carried forward into the present contract such as occurred in
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
though the past practice continued because there is no better evidence of
the parties' intent than to look at the explicit contract language.187
In Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. UAW, Local 811,188 Arbitrator Jones held
that the past practice was not canceled by the merger clause because the
past practice continued unabated into the new contract period. 89 In
FruehaufTrailer Co., there was a past practice of testing welders who were
bidding for job openings and awarding jobs to senior employees who
passed the tests. 90 After a senior employee was denied the position, the
union filed a grievance. 9' The merger clause that was inserted in the
agreement stated:
"This contract supersedes and cancels all previous Agreements, both
written and oral, and constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties
hereto. No agreement, understanding, alteration, variation, waiver or
modification of this Agreement, terms, provisions, covenants or condi-
tions contaifned herein shall bind the parties hereto unless made and
executed in writing by the parties hereto and made a part hereof."'1
However, the merger clause was not newly inserted, but continued from the
previous contract term, and under both terms, the past practice remained in
effect.193 Arbitrator Jones held that the past practice was binding on the
company and thus they had violated the contract by denying the senior
employee the position.'94 Arbitrator Jones reasoned that "[t]he repeated
execution of collective bargaining agreements which contain exclusive
agreement provisions cancelling 'all previous agreements' has no magical
dissolving effect upon practices or customs which are continued in fact
this matter, an attendant 'zipper clause' such as Section 9.05 is deemed to have
been waived."Id at *8; see also Michigan Milk Producers Ass'n v. Dairy Workers,
Local 86,95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1184, 1186 (1990) (KannerArb.) (noting that
the past practice had occurred during the current contract term, a factor that favored
holding the past practice binding on the parties).
187 See HILL & SINICROPI, supra note 82, at 59-60.
188 Fniehauf Trailer Co. v. UAW, Local 811, 29 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 372
(1957) (Jones, Jr., Arb.).
189 See id. at 375.
'
90 See id. at 372-73.
191 See id.
92 Id. at 374 (quoting the collective bargaining agreement).
'9' See id. at 375.
194 See id.
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unabated and which span successive contract periods." ' Additionally,
Arbitrator Jones stated that
it is well accepted that a course of conduct engaged in by one party and
acquiesced in by the other party to a collective bargaining agreement,
spanning two or more contract terms, without any interim contractual
reaction to it, becomes a part of the agreement between the parties and
cannot be substantially altered or discontinued except by bilateral
negotiations and agreement. 96
In Alaska v. Alaska State Employees Ass "n AFSCME, Local 52,19' the
arbitrator held that the contract clause excluded the binding effect of the
past practice regardless of the fact that the past practice continued unabated
into the new contract period.9" In Alaska State Employees Ass 'nAFSCME,
Local 52, the State defended its action of discontinuing a past practice of
paying overtime pay for hours of work exceeding 37.5 hours per week to
certain FLSA-exempt employees in the Department of Transportation and
Public Facilities.'9 Article 37.A of the agreement stated:
"This Agreement is the entire Agreement between the Employer and the
Union. The parties acknowledge that they have fully bargained with
respect to all terms and conditions of employment and have settled them
for the duration of this Agreement. This Agreement terminates all prior
agreements and understandings either verbal or in writing except as
provided at B below, and concludes collective bargaining for the duration
of this Agreement"20
Holding that the merger clause excluded the past practice, Arbitrator Levak
stated: "[W]hile there is some disagreement, a majority of arbitrators
support the position that merely because a practice is in effect for some
19 5 Id.
196 Id.
97 Alaska v. Alaska State Employees Ass'n AFSCME, Local 52, 1992 WL
725777 (Sept. 29, 1992) (Levak, Arb.).
198 See id. at *12-13.
199 See id. at * 1.2 0 Id. at *4 (quoting the collective bargaining agreement).
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period of time after the effective date of a new contract, the employer is not
estopped to rely upon the zipper clause."2 1
In Hubbell Industrial Controls, Inc. v. International Association of
Machinists, Local 1825,202 the employer cautiously ensured that the past
practice did continue unabated into the new contract period after the merger
clause was inserted in the agreement. 0 3 In Hubbell Industrial Controls,
Inc., the employer refused to pay union shop committee members for their
time while attending a fourth step grievance meeting, even though the
employer had allowed such pay for over thirty years.2°4 In addition to give-
and-take bargaining over the insertion of the clause, Arbitrator Talarico
noted the employer's reaction the first time such an issue arose during the
new contract term.205 Arbitrator Talarico stated:
Some reported decisions reveal that Arbitrators have sometimes ignored
the effect of a "zipper" clause under circumstances where the disputed
practice was continued after the adoption of an Agreement containing a
"zipper" clause. However, in this case there is no question that the very
first time a grievance arose subsequent to the new Collective Bargaining
Agreement the Employer determined that it would not pay Union Shop
Committee members for their attendance at Fourth Step grievance
proceedings. 206
201 Id. at * 12. It is interesting to note that Arbitrator Levak dealt with a similar
issue in Alaska Airlines, Inc.; however, the result was different. See Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Flight Attendants, No. 36-18-2-50-94, 1995 WL 862215,
at *8 (Oct. 9, 1995) (Levak, Arb.). InAlaska Airlines, Inc., Arbitrator Levak held
that the contract clause did not exclude the past practice, reasoning that the clause
was "substantively indistinguishable" from the clause in the prior agreement under
which the past practice continued. See id. at *8.
202 Hubbell Indus. Controls, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local
1825, 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 350 (1992) (Talarico, Arb.).
203 See id. at 354.
204 See id. at 351-52. Section 85 of the collective bargaining agreement stated:
"This Agreement replaces the Agreement of August 1, 1988, and such
former Agreement shall be null and void and deemed not to exist. This
Agreement contains all of the provisions agreed upon by the Company and
the Union. All prior agreements and understandings, unless written and
signed by both the company and the union, shall terminate upon execution
of this Agreement. No amendments or modifications of this Agreement
shall be valid unless it is agreed to by the Company and the Union and
reduced to writing."
Id.
205 See id. at 353-54.
2 6Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
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Therefore, the company's action of ensuring that the past practice
discontinued at the start of the new contract term was one factor that led to
the successful elimination of the binding past practice.
As reflectedbythe decisions discussed above, arbitrators hold different
views as to the impact of a past practice continuing into a new contract
term when the contract contains a merger clause. It is clear, however, that
this is an important factor examined by arbitrators.
C. .Bargaining History
Sometimes arbitrators turn to the parties' bargaining history to
determine the effect of a merger clause on binding past practices. Some
arbitrators have held that the specific past practice must have been
discussed during bargaining; otherwise, the practice is not revoked by the
insertion of the merger clause. 7 However, most arbitrators do not require
evidence of actual notice to discontinue a specific past practice, but give-
and-take bargaining over the insertion of the merger clause is often a factor
considered.0 8
In UAW, Local 882 v. Douglas Autotech Corp.,209 Arbitrator Knott
required actual notification of intent to discontinue the past practice. ° In
this case, employees had been allowed reasonable time to take breaks and
use vending machines during work hours for over thirty years.1 The
207 See infra notes 209-24 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 225-41 and accompanying text.
209 UAW, Local 882 v. Douglas Autotech Corp., 94-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
3791 (1993) (Knott, Arb.).210 See id. at 3797; see also Albertson's Inc. v. Hospital & Serv. Employees
Union, Local 399, 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 897, 900 (1996) (Kaufian, Arb.)
(holding that the merger clause did not preclude the continuation of the past
practice because "[tio escape, the employer must advise the union during contract
negotiations that it will no longer consent to the continuation of the practice");
Elberta Crate & Box Co. v. International Woodworkers of Am., Local S-181, 32
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 228,233 (1959) (Murphy, Arb.) (requiring bargaining over
the elimination of the past practice because the employees had relied on the
practice for a long period of time).
21
' See UAW, Local 882, 94-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) at 3792. It is important
to note that there was a contractual clause in the contract on break periods, but not
on the use ofvending machines. See id. at 3791-92. See generally FAIRWEATHER'S
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 179-82 (Ray J. Schoonhoven
ed., 3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter FAIRWEATHER'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE]
(discussing the use of bargaining history to interpret ambiguous contract language).
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employer issued new rules regarding breaks which unilaterally terminated
this past practice.212 A merger clause in the bargaining agreement stated:
"This Agreement supersedes and cancels all prior practices and agree-
ments, whether written or oral, unless expressly stated to the contrary
herein, and constitutes the complete and entire agreement between the
parties."2 3 Arbitrator Knott held that the merger clause did not allow
unilateral termination of the past practice.2 4 Arbitrator Knott stated that
"[a]rbitrators have consistently held that established practices which were
in existence when the contract was negotiated and were not revoked at the
time are binding on the parties and continue for the life of the
agreement."215 Thus, he concluded that "[t]he key here is that no clear
notice was given to the Union about the elimination or curtailment of the
use of the vending machines. 21 6
In United Paperworkers International Union, Local 713 v. Stone
Container Corp.,217 however, the arbitrator required actual bargaining over
the past practice in order to save the past practice from elimination by the
contract's merger clause.1 ' The company unilaterally terminated the past
practice of allowing the office switchboard employees to take personal
messages for employees, except in emergency situations.2 9 Article II of the
contract, entitled "Prior Customs and Practices," stated: "This Agreement
supersedes all rules, regulations or customs heretofore established. All
understandings entered into during the life of this Agreement must be
reduced to writing." ' Arbitrator Bain held that the employer had the right
to unilaterally terminate the past practice under the merger clause." The
arbitrator reasoned that there was no contract provision on the topic of the
past practice and that the agreement contained a merger clause excluding
oral past practices not included inthe agreement.'m Additionally, Arbitrator
212 See UAW, Local 882, 94-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCII) at 3792.
213 Id. at 3794.
214 See id.
21 1 Id. at 3796.
2161 d. at 3797. Arbitrator Knott also noted that the practice had continued un-
abated into the new contract period for almost one year. See id.
217 United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 713 v. Stone Container Corp., 94-2
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCII) 5235 (1994) (Bain, Arb.).211 See id. at 5238.
219 See id. at 5236.
221 Id. at 5235.
221 See id. at 5238.
222 See id. It is also interesting to note that the current agreement became
effective between the parties on January 21, 1993, and the memo banning the past
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Bain stressed that there was no discussion of the practice during negotia-
tionsm Thus, he concluded that "[a]bsent such evidence[,] the Company
has the ability to institute a unilateral change unless the phone call policy
had been amajorbenefit or discontinuance of the benefit would oppress the
employees." 4
In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Allied Industrial Workers ofAmerica, Local
345,m2 the bargaining history was the sole factor considered by Arbitrator
Rauch. Arbitrator Rauch found an oral merger clause through statements
made during bargaining.2 6 In Weyerhaeuser Co., a past practice existed
that allowed employees to go to the lunchroom during working hours.
227
This is an interesting case because there was no written merger clause in
the agreement; however, the arbitrator found that an oral merger clause
effectively eliminated the binding effect of the past practice.22 Arbitrator
Rauch reasoned that while the company tried to unsuccessfully insert a
merger clause into the agreement, "[m]anagement made it clear to the
Union Committee that the terms of the new contract, as written, would be
'the Bible."' 22 9 The company told the union that all past practices the union
thought existed should be revealed, bargained over, and if both parties
agreed, inserted in the written agreement.230 Arbitrator Rauch concluded,
therefore, that because the union did not discuss this past practice with the
company during bargaining and because the practice was not included in
the written agreement, the past practice was not binding on the parties."
Effectively, the oral statement made by the company during bargaining
constituted an oral merger clause eliminating the binding effect of the past
practice. 2
practice was issued on April 6, 1993. See id. at 5236. Thus, the past practice
continued unabated over three months into the new contract period; however, the
arbitrator made no mention of this occurrence. See id.
22 See id.
224 Id. at 5238.
1 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Allied Indus. Workers ofAm., Local 345,71 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 61 (1978) (Rauch, Arb.).226 See id. at 63.227 See id. at 62-63.
n' See id.
229 Id. at 63.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See id.
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In Hubbell Industrial Controls, Inc. v. International Ass"n ofMachin-
ists, Local 1825,"3 ArbitratorTalarico usedbargaining history as one factor
in his determination of the effectiveness of the merger clause.3 InHubbell,
the employer refused to pay union shop committee members for their
attendance at a fourth step grievance meeting, even though the employer
had paid for such time for over thirty years." Section 85 of the agreement
stated:
"This Agreement replaces the Agreement of August 1, 1998, and such
former Agreement shall be null and void and deemed not to exist. This
Agreement contains all of the provisions agreed upon by the Company
and the Union. All prior agreements and understandings, unless written
and signed by both the company and the union, shall terminate upon
execution of this Agreement. No amendments or modifications of this
Agreement shall be valid unless it is agreed to by the Company and the
Union and reduced to writing."' 36
Arbitrator Talarico held that the contract clause eliminated the binding
effect of the practice.?7 Talarico noted the clear merger clause language
and stated that "[a]lthough, normally it is not necessary to delve into
bargaining history when confronted with clear contract language, I consider
the bargaining history surrounding this provision to be a very significant
factor in support of the ultimate determination reached herein." '
Reviewing the bargaining room conduct, Arbitrator Talarico stated that the
union protested the first proposed merger clause by the company because
233 Hubbell Indus. Controls, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local
1825, 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 350 (1992) (Talarico, Arb.).234 See id. at353-54; see also OaklandUniv. v. Michigan Council 25 AFSCME,
Local 1418, 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 872,874 (1996) (Daniel, Arb.) (noting that
one reason the merger clause did not eliminate the binding effect of the past
practice was because the parties bargained over the insertion of the clause knowing
that there were past practices that they intended to continue); Union Camp Corp.
v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 388, F.M.C.S. CaseNo. 93-18279,1994
WL 836436, at *5-6 (Feb. 14, 1994) (Bragg, Arb.) (discussing the murky
bargaining history between the parties regarding the merger clause, but concluding
that the language of the merger clause sufficiently eliminated the binding effect of
the past practice).235 See Hubbell, 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 351-52.
236 Id. at 351 (quoting the collective bargaining agreement).
23' See id. at 353.238 id.
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it eliminated written side agreements in addition to oral agreements.239
However, the union agreed to the present clause, which only terminated
oral agreements or understandings not contained in the written
agreement. 240 Therefore, the give-and-take bargaining between the parties
was an additional factor used by the arbitrator in reaching his conclusion.241
D. Use ofPast Practice to Interpret Ambiguous Contract Provisions
Past practices may be used to interpret ambiguous contractual
provisions, regardless of the existence of a merger clause.242 However, this
provides an opportunity for arbitrators to allow past practices to bind the
parties regardless of a merger clause any time there is a separate contrac-
tual provision on point because the finding of an ambiguity is by its very
nature somewhat subjective.
HSAutomotive, Inc. v. United Steelworkers ofAmerica, Local 7597243
is an example of where an arbitrator stretched the idea of using a past
practice to interpret an ambiguous contractual provision.244 A past practice
had developed that allowed overtime to be voluntary even though a
contractual provision stated that it was required due to the nature of the
business.245 The agreement contained a strongly worded merger clause.246
11 See id. (noting that the union disapproved of the employer's proposal to
amend section 85 because the amendment purportedly revoked "all prior
agreements and understandings-whether written or oral," thereby eliminating
"many extraneous written agreements that should be retained by the parties").240 See id.
241 See id.
242 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1547 v. Municipality
of Anchorage, A.A.A. No. 75-L390-0253-91, 1992 WL 717751, at *7-8 (June 15,
1992) (Runkel, Arb.) (holding that "payments to [a pension fund] were made under
the Old Contract as a matter of the parties' interpretation of the contract and not as
a matter of unrelated past practice"); Michigan Milk Producers Ass'n v. Dairy
Workers, Local 86, 95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1184, 1186 (1990) (Kanner, Arb.)
(holding that the merger clause did not preclude a party from using the past practice
to clear up an ambiguous contractual provision). See generally FAIRWEATHER'S
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 211, at 172-78 (discussing the rules of
contract interpretation).
243 HS Automotive, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 7597, 105 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 681 (1995) (Klein, Arb.).
24 See id. at 686-87.
245 See id. at 682-84.
246 See id. at 684. Article XVI, section C entitled "Complete Agreement" stated:
"The above basic agreement concludes all negotiations affecting wages,
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Arbitrator Klein held that the merger clause did not eliminate the binding
effect of the past practice because the contract clause on overtime was
ambiguous.247 Arbitrator Klein cited the Eighth Circuit's rule that
[r]esort to such extrinsic sources as bargaining history and past and
collateral agreements is permissible even where the terms of the agree-
ment are superficially clear, if the arbitrator discerns a latent ambiguity
in any of the terms or if the language of the agreement does not appear
fully to express the intent of the parties.248
Therefore, according to this arbitrator, any time there is a past practice on
the topic of the contract provision, the past practice can be used even if the
contract clause appears to be clear and unambiguous because the agreement
"does not appear fully to express the intent of the parties." '249 Therefore, it
can be extremely difficult to predict the effectiveness of a merger clause
when the contract contains another contract clause on the same or a similar
topic that is in dispute.
E. Peculiar Facts and Circumstances of the Case Affecting the
Arbitrator's Decision
Sometimes it appears that particular facts or circumstances of the case
affect the arbitrator's decision. The following facts have influenced
arbitrators: (1) the parties' reliance on the past practice;25 (2) the benefits
hours and working conditions, is in final disposition of all demands of the
Union presented or which could have been presented in the negotiations
leading to its execution, and the parties [sic] relationship shall be governed
solely by this basic agreement. All prior agreements and understandings,
whether oral or written are rendered null and void, and this basic agreement
executed by the parties or any letter of understanding, signed by the
Company and by a representative of the International Union and the Local
Union President shall govern the relationship between the parties."
Id.
247 See id. at 686-87.
24 Id. at 686 (emphasis added) (citation omitted in original).
249 id.
" See Elberta Crate & Box Co. v. International Woodworkers of Am., Local
S-181, 32 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 228, 233 (1959) (Murphy, Arb.) (noting the
reliance of the employees on the past practice and holding that the merger clause
did not eliminate the binding effect of the past practice).
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of continuing the past practice;251 (3) the bad faith conduct of the parties;" 2
and (4) whether the company is undergoing change."
In Dura Corp. v. Allied Industrial Workers, Local 238,254 Arbitrator
Cabe held that the normal result as to the effect of a merger clause on a past
practice was not applicable to the particular circumstances in the case.255
The prior contract allowed a three-minute period to clean up around the
machinery and to wash before checking out.25 6 However, the new contract
required employees not to check out until the entire shift had ended, while
the wash period provision of the contract remained unchanged.257 Section
3 of article XIII contained a merger clause which stated:
" See Oakland Univ. v. Michigan Council 25 AFSCME, Local 1418, 106 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 872, 874 (1996) (Daniel, Arb.) (stressing that the past practice
of allowing the union president parking privileges benefited both parties by
allowing "the benefit of expeditious and convenient access to the union president
to assure proper administration of the contract and to avoid labor disputes
disrupting operations").
"
2 See Arvin Indus., Inc. v. UAW, Local 1930, 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 14,
17-19 (1981) (Yarowsky, Arb.) (involving a union representative's misleading
comments to a company representative during bargaining); New York Tap Rock
Corp. v. International HOD Carriers of Am., Local 60, 19 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
421,422 (1952) (Giardino, Arb.) (allowing the unilateral discontinuance of a past
pay practice, stating that it was discriminatory to those who did not receive such
pay); cf Union Camp Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 388,
F.M.C.S. No. 93-18279, 1994 WL 836436, at *6 (Feb. 14, 1994) (Bragg, Arb.)
(noting that there was no evidence of the union's "devious intentions"); Hubbell
Indus. Controls, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 1825, 100 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 350, 353 (1992) (Talarico, Arb.) (stating that the employer did
not "attempt to 'slip one past' the Union by inserting amended language into the
new contract that would perhaps go unnoticed").
253 See Midwest Dental Prods. Corp. v. Tool & Die Makers, Local 113, 94 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 467, 470 (1990) (Wies, Arb.) (stating that the facts in the
particular case did not justify the normal conclusion because the elimination of the
past practice appeared justified because of the cost savings and the fact that the
company was under new ownership); Dura Corp. v. Allied Indus. Workers, Local
238, 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 94, 98 (1977) (Cabe, Arb.) (distinguishing the case
from a normal outcome because of "the substantial changes that occur in a plant
when it moves from a small operation to one of a larger production capacity").
254 Dura Corp. v. Allied Indus. Workers, Local 238, 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
94 (1977) (Cabe, Arb.).
255 See id. at 98.
256 See id. at 95-96.
217See id. at 96.
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"The provisions of this Contract constitute the entire Agreement between
the Company and the Union, and no agreement, alteration, understanding,
variation, waiver or modification of any of the terms, conditions or
covenants contained herein shall be made by an employee or group of
employees with the Company, and in no case shall it be binding upon the
parties hereto unless such agreement is made and executed in writing and
signed by the proper Company and Union officials.
258
Arbitrator Cabe held that the contract language eliminated the binding past
practice.259 Arbitrator Cabe noted that "[a]rbitrators usually rule that when
a contract does not specifically change a provision the past practices in
effect will continue.1260 However, he differentiated this case because
arbitrators do not normally allow past practices to be eliminated in such
cases in order to maintain normal operations, but in this case, the plant was
undergoing changes in size and the change was necessary to adjust.261
In Elberta Crate & Box Co. v. International Woodworkers ofAmerica,
Local S-181,262 the arbitrator stressed the importance of the consideration
of the particular facts of the case in reaching a decision. 63 In Elberta Crate
& Box Co., the employer eliminated the past practice of allowing employ-
ees to eat their lunches while working and required employees to take a
half-hour lunch without pay.264 Arbitrator Murphy held that the merger
clause did not allow the elimination of the binding past practice. 65
Arbitrator Murphy stressed that "[e]ach agreement and each past practice
must, of course, be interpreted in the light of their own special circum-
stances and the relationship between the parties, their understandings and
what they have done under the Agreement, and the meaning which has
grown up and around the Agreement. 2 66 Arbitrator Murphy seemed to be
most concerned with the employees' reliance on this past practice and
'z
8 Id. at 95 (quoting the collective bargaining agreement).
259 See id. at 98.
260 Id.
261 See id.
262 Elberta Crate &Box Co. v. International Woodworkers ofAm., Local S- 181,
32 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 228 (1959) (Murphy, Arb.).
263 See id. at 230.
264 See id. at 228-29.
265 See id. at 233.266Id. at 230.
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appeared to conclude that it would be unfair to withdraw the employees'
ability to choose to work through lunch.267 Arbitrator Murphy stated:
My feeling is that where the past practice has been established for such a
long period of time, where the employees working there have been given
reasonable grounds for believing that it will continue and they therefore
could be expected to adjust their personal lives to working under these
conditions, andwhere the practicebegan through a definite understanding
between the Company and the employees concerned growing out of a
mutual problem which both Company and employees meet and faced and
decided upon, then this is strong evidence that this is the kind of practice
which will become a part of an Agreement unless the Agreement clearly
says that this is not to be so.26
8
Therefore, as reflected by the arbitration decisions above, it can be very
difficult to predict the outcome of a particular case because often arbitra-
tors may consider the particular facts and their reactions to the parties'
actions in determining the effectiveness of a merger clause's elimination
of a binding past practice.
V. CONCLUSION
A zipper clause and a merger clause involve separate and distinct
concepts. A merger clause "exclud[es] from coverage any external
agreements not made an explicit part of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement.1269 A zipper clause states, however, that "the parties have had
the right and opportunity to bargain over all, mandatory subjects of
bargaining and that they waive their right to bargain over [such] matters
during the term of the agreement." '27 The great confusion regarding the
label of a merger clause necessitates a close examination of the clause
before concluding whether a contract clause is a merger clause or a zipper
clause. It is important to determine which type of clause the issue involves
because the legal consequences of the two clauses are radically different.
271
267 See id. at 233.
268Ird.
St. Joseph County Mental Health Facility v. American Fed'n of State
Employees, Council 25, 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 683, 685 (1985) (Girolamo,
Arb.).270 FELDACKER, supra note 19, at 129.
271 See supra notes 18-79 and accompanying text.
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The merger or total agreement clause, which has its origins in general
contract law, can have a significant impact on the interpretation and
application of collective bargaining agreements. A merger clause in a
collective bargaining agreement may be important in determining the
impact of the parol evidence rule on an agreement alleged to have been
made in bargaining, but has not found its way into a written contract.
Additionally, the presence or absence of a merger clause, as well as the
specific language in the clause, may impact an arbitrator in determining if
otherwise binding past practices survive the negotiation and execution of
anew collective bargaining agreement. A major portion of these comments
have dealt with this inquiry. Based on an examination of arbitration
decisions, it is submitted that arbitrators often consider the following
factors in determining the effectiveness of a merger clause's elimination of
a binding past practice: (1) the precise wording of the merger clause; 72 (2)
whether the past practice continued unabated into a new contract term;273
(3) the parties' bargaining history regarding the past practice and insertion
of the merger clause;274 (4) whether an ambiguous contractual provision is
involved;2  and (5) whether there are any peculiar facts or circumstances
that might affect the arbitrator's decision.276
As to the merger clause language, if the term "past practices" or
"practices" is contained in the clause language, it is very likely that the
merger clause will successfully eliminate the binding past practice.2"
However, if there was a separate contract clause on the topic of the past
practice which could be construed as ambiguous, the past practice can be
used to interpret the ambiguous contract language, regardless of the
specific merger clause language, under the rules of contract
interpretation. 27 However, the term "past practice" is not necessary for a
merger clause to effectively eliminate a binding past practice.27 9 As a
matter of fact, the term is usually not included in such clauses because the
use of the merger clause to eliminate a past practice is apparently often an
afterthought by the employer or the union. However, the lack of a specific
272 See supra notes 102-84 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 20741 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 24249 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 250-68 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 103-31 and accompanying text; cf supra notes 143-49 and
accompanying text (discussing arbitration cases that have noted the absence of the
term "past practices" in the merger clause language).278 See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 156-84 and accompanying text.
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reference to past practices in a merger clause leaves more room for an
arbitrator to find that the parties did not intend that the merger clause
eliminate binding past practices.
Arbitrators' views vary as to the effect of a past practice continuing
unabated into a new contract period; however, it is an important factor
considered by most arbitrators."' As to the parties' bargaining history on
the past practice or on the insertion of the merger clause, most arbitrators
do not require evidence of actual notice of intent to discontinue a specific
past practice,28' but give-and-take bargaining over the insertion of a merger
clause is often a factor considered by arbitrators.282
It must be remembered that past practices may be used to interpret
ambiguous contractual provisions, regardless of the existence of a merger
clause.23 However, this opens the opportunity for arbitrators to allow past
practices to bind the parties regardless of a merger clause any time there is
a separate contractual provision on point because a finding of an ambiguity
is by its very nature somewhat subjective.8 4 Finally, an arbitrator might
consider the particular facts and his or her reactions to the parties' actions
in determining the effectiveness of a merger clause's elimination of a
binding past practice.85
The better-reasoned arbitral awards indicate that contract language is
the most important factor in determining the effectiveness of a merger
clause's elimination of a binding past practice. However, if the contract
language is not particularly strong or weak, arbitrators frequently give
considerable weight to other factors, such as whether the past practice
continued unabated into the new contract term, the parties' bargaining
history regarding the past practice, and the insertion of the merger clause
into the collective bargaining agreement. Perhaps most significant of such
other factors is the fact that past practices may be used to interpret
ambiguous contractual language, thus leaving the opportunity for arbitra-
tors to ignore even the strongest-worded merger clauses. Additionally, it
must be remembered that the specific facts of a case may influence the
particular arbitral outcome.
2See supra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 209-24 and accompanying text.
2See supra notes 225-41 and accompanying text.
2See supra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 250-68 and accompanying text.

